

# Jackson's Strategy and Performance

Michael Wells, President






## The Jackson Story

1. Management Team and Company History
2. Product Diversification
3. Value-Added Distribution
4. Efficient Technology and Award-Winning Customer Service
5. Robust Risk Management
6. Long-Term Success




# Tenured Jackson Senior Management Team





# Positioned for Growth




- Insurance
- Asset Management
- Wealth Management
- Brokerage



# Jackson's Strategy

## Maximize select opportunities in the U.S. retirement market




Sources: The Asset Management Industry in 2010: Bigger, sometimes better – and the best pulling away, McKinsey  
The Future of Advice, Tiburon



# Jackson's Strategy

## Maximize select opportunities in the U.S. retirement market




Sources: The Asset Management Industry in 2010: Bigger, sometimes better – and the best pulling away, McKinsey  
The Future of Advice, Tiburon



# Where Jackson Participates in the US Market

## Breakdown of US Asset Pools – 2009, in Billions


**Jackson participates in the IRA, Non-qualified Annuity and Wealth Management space**  
**In 2010, Jackson is on pace to hit \$17.3b in Annuities and \$2.0b in Separately Managed Accounts**



Source: Cerulli Qualitative Update – State of US Retail and Institutional Asset Management 2010  
 Source: (Retirement Market Assets): ICI Research Fundamentals – August 2010  
 Non-Prof Managed Assets includes IRA & 401(k) assets not accessible to asset managers



# Jackson Retail Sales – Up 37%








# Strength in Key Channels

## Total 2009 Annuity Sales




- Total Annuity Market by Channels Jackson Serves = \$159.9b

% Indicates Jackson Market Share by Channel  
Source: LIMRA



# VA Sales Growth

## Jackson Variable Annuity Sales by Distribution Channel 9M09 vs 9M10






% Indicates Jackson Market Share by Channel. Source: Morningstar Annuity Research Center. IBD (Independent Broker/Dealer). RBD (Regional Broker/Dealer)



# National Planning Holdings



## NPH provides significant benefits for Jackson:

- Outlet for house brand (Jackson & Curian)
- Market intelligence
- Reoccurring fees (WealthOne)
- Leverage for shelf space
- Scale through Jackson integration
- Profits






## Growing, Profitable and Scalable Wealth Management Business



- September 2010 AUM up 31% from year-end 2009
- \$1.5 billion in YTD September 2010 deposits, up 20% from year-end 2009
- Over 45,000 customer accounts through September 2010
- Profitable with YTD September 2010 net income of \$3.2 million



# Jackson's Distribution Model




**Record contacts attained through growth of sales teams and increased efficiencies  
“per wholesaler”**

2010\* - Projected annualized based on results through September  
Includes all channels (JNLD-R, JNLD-G, IMG, RBD, and Curian)



# Jackson's Distribution Model

All supporting metrics are strong — Producers, Premium and Tickets




2010\* Projected annualized based on results through September



## Self-financed Profitable Growth

**Jackson significantly outperformed the industry in profitable growth over the last business cycle\***

### Growth of the Business over Cycle




- Jackson has grown faster than the industry while significantly increasing its capital base
- Total adjusted capital increased from \$2.9b 2002 to \$4.6b 2010 (\$598m from 12/31/09 to 9/30/10)
- This gives us the regulatory capital headroom to meet the Group's requirements for capital distribution

\* 31 December 2002 through 30 June 2010  
Source: Highline Data. Premium growth calculations based on 2Q annualised.



## Growth in Statutory Admitted Assets



- Since 1995, Jackson has quintupled statutory premium, nearly quadrupled statutory assets, and tripled statutory capital
- Jackson has accomplished this and returned ~\$633m of net capital to Prudential over that period
- By any measure, Prudential has executed a more successful US strategy than its European competitors





## Expenses/Assets (Statutory)

**Jackson has the lowest general insurance expense to assets ratio compared to its competitors and has maintained this ranking from 2005-1H10**


	\$ millions	1H10 General Expenses	1H10 Avg Net Admitted Assets	1H10 Ratio bps	2009 Ratio in bps	2008 Ratio in bps	2007 Ratio in bps	2006 Ratio in bps	2005 Ratio in bps	Basis Point Change 2005 to 1H10
<b>1</b>	<b>Jackson</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>79,204</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-1</b>
<b>2</b>	AXA	688	135,254	51	51	63	51	49	58	-7
<b>3</b>	Allianz	403	75,719	53	60	72	78	70	84	-31
<b>4</b>	Pacific Life	500	92,972	54	56	55	66	78	86	-32
<b>5</b>	Old Mutual	94	17,158	55	57	84	69	75	76	-21
<b>6</b>	Aviva	240	43,698	55	58	66	63	66	74	-19
<b>7</b>	Manulife (J. Hancock)	1,183	209,364	57	59	62	58	61	73	-16
<b>8</b>	Hartford	1,347	217,492	62	67	66	64	74	71	-9
<b>9</b>	Ameriprise	522	80,909	65	63	91	116	114	120	-55
<b>10</b>	Prudential Financial	2,455	358,843	68	67	56	60	60	67	1
<b>11</b>	ING	1,182	169,983	70	68	78	73	69	77	-7
<b>12</b>	Allstate	504	71,861	70	67	69	56	63	74	-4
<b>13</b>	AEON (Transamerica)	1,389	175,014	79	73	71	71	70	74	5
<b>14</b>	Lincoln National	1,166	145,415	80	81	84	80	73	86	-6
<b>15</b>	MetLife	4,156	432,064	96	99	93	84	88	101	-5
<b>16</b>	Sun Life	602	61,770	97	98	94	101	77	70	27
<b>17</b>	Genworth	680	66,108	103	100	112	104	121	123	-20
<b>18</b>	Mass Mutual	1,368	129,529	106	104	86	89	100	91	15
<b>19</b>	Principal	1,219	114,695	106	100	109	107	113	116	-10
<b>20</b>	AIG	3,251	304,509	107	105	96	78	83	84	23
<b>21</b>	New York Life	2,248	199,300	113	111	109	108	119	115	-2
	<b>GROUP AVERAGE</b>			<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>-8</b>




# Earnings

## Growing Profitability and Improved Earnings Diversification

### Jackson IFRS Pretax Operating Income



### Jackson IFRS Pretax Operating Income by Source



\* Fee-based product operating income adjusted to exclude hedge gains/losses in FY08, FY09 and 1H10



# Industry Earnings Comparison

## 2009 Combined Statutory Income Statement Peer Data for Large VA Writers

		Five-Year Avg. Return on TAC	Five-Year Avg. ROA
1	Principal	14.16%	0.90%
2	<b>Jackson</b>	<b>12.97%</b>	<b>0.88%</b>
3	Prudential Financial	11.49%	0.59%
4	Ameriprise	11.38%	0.62%
5	AEGON	11.36%	0.72%
6	Lincoln	11.13%	0.68%
7	AXA	8.75%	0.71%
8	MetLife	8.70%	0.67%
9	Pacific Life	1.53%	0.08%
10	Sun Life	(5.18)%	(0.11)%
	<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>8.63%</b>	<b>0.57%</b>

TAC = Total Adjusted Capital  
Source: Fitch Ratings from Highline



## The Jackson Advantage

- Experienced Management Team
- Headroom in Markets
- Profitable with Earnings Diversity
- Outperformed in the Last Cycle
- Well positioned for Future Cycles

# Jackson's Risk Management


Chad Myers

Jackson EVP, Asset/Liability Management





# Jackson Risk Management







# Jackson Liability Profile

## Statutory Reserves - Major Product Categories



CAGR 2002 to 9/30/2010 = 9%



- Fixed Annuities (-8%)
- GA Variable Annuities (+149%)
- SA Variable Annuities (+979%)
- Fixed Index Annuities (+219%)
- Institutional Products (-45%)
- Life Insurance (+40%)
- Other (+47%)



# Jackson Risk Management








# Deterministic Shocks

## Financial Risk Summary Q2, 2010




- Risk limits are set within the ALCO policy
- Deterministic shocks are used that are consistent with 99.5% historical tails
- The policy limits the amount of exposed capital to each of these events
- Soft limit for total risk assumes no correlation offset while hard limit assumes modest correlation benefits
- Based on available capital, total financial risk used is 48% of hard limit



# Economic Capital Q2 2010


## Capital Allocation





# Hedges Have Protected IFRS Earnings Over Economic Cycle

## VA Guarantee Impact on IFRS Operating Earnings: January 2008 - June 2010



- VA guarantees, net of hedging, have been a positive contributor to IFRS operating earnings
- Only portions of IFRS are on a fair value basis leading to a disconnect between value changes in hedges and guarantees
- Several companies have chosen to hedge the accounting results and left themselves exposed economically



## VA Accounting Issues


- Jackson hedges on an economic basis
  - Stochastic valuation of cash flows using conservative estimate of realised volatility
- IFRS accounting varies by benefit
  - GMDB valued based on SOP 03-01
  - GMWB (not for life) valued under FAS 157
  - GMWB (for life) valued under a hybrid of these methods
- SOP 03-01
  - Uses the concept of accumulated fees which are periodically trued up to changes in expected cash flows
  - Reserve changes are not very responsive to short term market moves
  - Responsiveness is a function of policy age and time remaining until payout
- FAS 157
  - Fair value method using market implied volatility and “own credit curve”
  - Does not allow for gain on sale thus eliminating a portion of the fees
  - More responsive to market, but material differences from an economic approach

**Jackson has always chosen to hedge its risks on an economic basis and accept the resulting accounting volatility caused by current IFRS rules**



# Hedges Have Protected Regulatory Capital Over Economic Cycle

## VA Guarantee Impact on Capital: January 2008 - June 2010



- Net capital impact over crisis was less than 1% of available capital
- Fees continue to exceed claims by a significant amount
- Reserve increase includes voluntary reserves in excess of regulatory minimums



## Variable Annuity Performance Factors

Guarantee Structure

Guarantee Pricing

Fund Selection

Distribution Selection

Risk Diversification

Hedging Approach



# Variable Annuity Performance Factors

## Guarantee Structure

Risk profile

Policyholder behaviour

Hedging implications



# Variable Annuity Performance Factors

## Guarantee Pricing

Charge needs to support hedging

Approach needs to work across the cycle

Policyholder behaviour





# Variable Annuity Performance Factors

## Fund Selection

Passive vs. Active

Concentration within money managers

Fund restrictions



# Variable Annuity Performance Factors

## Distribution Selection

Choice of channel

Compliance environment

Type of rep



## Variable Annuity Performance Factors

### Risk Diversification

Ability to aggregate risk

Extent of natural offsets

Correlation



# Variable Annuity Performance Factors

## Hedging Approach

Economic vs. Accounting

Full vs. Partial

Greeks



# Simplified Economic Returns

Variable Annuity		
Mortality and Expense Fees		1.25 %
Fund Management Fees		0.54 %
GM WB Fees		0.95%
Policy Fees		0.01 %
Total Fees		2.75%
Acquisition Costs:		
Commissions	7.50 %	
Marketing	1.80 %	
Issue Costs	0.22 %	
	9.52 %	
Acquisition Costs Over 10 Years		(0.95)%
Administrative Costs		(0.11)%
GM WB Expense		(0.95)%
Return of Premium Death Benefit		(0.05)%
<b>PROFIT MARGIN</b>		<b>0.69 %</b>
<b>CAPITAL REQUIREMENT</b>		<b>2.00 %</b>
Profit Ratio		34.5 %
Investment Return on Capital		4.60 %
Pretax Return on Capital		39.1 %
<b>After-tax Return on Capital</b>		<b>25.4 %</b>

Fixed Annuity		
Gross Yield		4.60 %
Investment Expenses and Default Costs		(0.35)%
Net Yield		4.25 %
Crediting Rate		(2.25)%
Gross Spread		2.00 %
Acquisition Costs:		
Commissions	6.00 %	
Marketing	1.80 %	
Issue Costs	0.38 %	
	8.18 %	
Acquisition Costs Over 10 Years		(0.82)%
Administrative Costs		(0.11)%
<b>PROFIT MARGIN</b>		<b>1.07 %</b>
<b>CAPITAL REQUIREMENT</b>		<b>8.00 %</b>
Profit Ratio		13.3 %
Investment Return on Capital		4.60 %
Pretax Return on Capital		17.9 %
<b>After-tax Return on Capital</b>		<b>11.7 %</b>

**These simplified models illustrate the relative returns of base variable and fixed annuity contracts. A VA contract has a lower absolute profit margin, but a higher return on capital due to a lower capital requirement.**




# Liability Update

## Variable Annuity Guaranteed Benefits

### Optional Benefits Elected

(% of Initial Benefits Elected)



\* YTD September 2010

### Breadth and Depth

- Lead industry in product choices – over 3,400 combinations
- Appeal to broader segment of producers/customers - only have to learn our product

### Cost of Features

- Not a price leader
- Client pays for what they elect
- Fees or income percent vary by age for optional lifetime benefits, more closely matches risk
- Lower fund fees


### Pricing Discipline

- Collaboration between ALM and Actuarial on assumptions
- Stochastic models - intricacies of benefit features included
- Conservative view on unproven assumptions, especially withdrawal utilization and lapses
- Re-engineer competitors' pricing - understand why we can/cannot follow their lead
- Periodic validation of assumptions



# GMWB Pricing

## Average GMWB Guarantee Fee




- Fees shown are for most popular GMWB for each company
- Jackson has had a stable fee over the past 2 years as our pricing basis is sustainable through the cycle
- Competitors were aggressively priced in 2008 and prior leading to a lack of funds for hedging
- Competitors have now over reacted the other direction as they seek to reduce sales and expand hedging activities



# GMWB Pricing

## Average Bonus




- Bonus added to benefit base in years with no withdrawal
- Delay in withdrawals mitigates risk in lifetime GMWBs
- Jackson uses a simple interest formula while most competitors have used compounded bonuses
- Adjusted to a compounded basis Jackson's bonus is less aggressive than peer companies





# GMWB Pricing

## Average Lock-in Age for Lifetime Withdrawals




- Customers must reach a minimum age before they are eligible to elect lifetime payments
- Jackson has been consistent at 59<sup>1/2</sup> years
- Competitors are more aggressive allowing for younger election ages
- Competitors growing more aggressive in recent months
- At present the average competitor allows 4<sup>1/2</sup> more years on lifetime payouts



# GMWB Pricing Dynamics (pre-hedge)


PV Profit by Percentile



- Profit distribution for the standalone benefit analyzed based on historical parameters as well as adjusted market consistent approach
- For this benefit both approaches converge around the 90th percentile of the historical distribution at break-even profit
- GMWB benefit is profitable at the historical mean and well into the tails
- Hedging activity expected to truncate the losses while retaining upside potential




# PV of Profit vs. Equity Allocation



- GMWB design allows for conservative view of policyholder behaviour
- Jackson does not force asset allocation but prices at a conservative level of equity exposure
- On a pricing basis (90<sup>th</sup> percentile) the equity allocation is priced assuming a level of 82%
- Using a historical mean profit measure there is no equity allocation that takes profits negative
- Jackson's current experience is in the range of 60-65%
- Across the cycle equity allocation did not exceed our pricing assumption
- Similar dynamics exist in the policyholder withdrawal utilization assumptions




# PV of Profit vs. Realized Volatility



- Jackson's pricing levels equate to a realized equity volatility of 25% over the life of the policy
- Using daily observations of 10 year rolling historical periods over more than 80 years this would exceed all but 6% of observations
- The observations above 25% all occurred in the 1930s
- Realized volatility did not exceed 23% in the 2000-2010 period despite two large bear markets
- In the event of extreme volatility Jackson could mitigate the costs by increasing fees on in-force policies



# Sustainable VA Business Model






# Investment Strategy

## Jackson's Current Portfolio Positioning

We are striving to construct a portfolio that will perform well across a wide range of market and macroeconomic outcomes



- While economic conditions are currently improving, risks to this outlook are high and lead us to a more conservatively positioned portfolio
- Diversification across asset classes, industries and issuers remains an important feature of our portfolio construction
- The portfolio has a distinct “up-in-quality” bias, including a much lower than normal exposure to high yield corporates and loans
- Risk reduction, increased cash inflow and slower primary issuance led to the increase in U.S. Treasury exposure earlier this year

9/30/10 Statement Value excludes policy loans  
Statutory financial data is consolidated to include Jackson National of New York.



# Investment Strategy

## Portfolio Risk Reduction Activity During 1<sup>st</sup> Half 2010

IFRS Value (\$ millions)	12/31/2009	Net Investment Activity	Impairments	3/31/2010	Net Investment Activity	Impairments	6/30/2010
<b>Non-Agency Prime + Alt-A</b>	2,187.0	(320.2)	(29.9)	1,836.9	(69.7)	(20.0)	1,767.2
<b>High Yield Corporates</b>	1,533.8	(129.2)	--	1,424.6	29.1	--	1,453.7
<b>Banks</b>							
U.S. Money Center	482.2	2.7	--	484.9	(1.3)	--	483.6
U.S. Regional	1,084.6	(521.4)	--	563.2	(35.8)	--	527.4
U.K. + European	558.1	(19.9)	--	538.2	(323.9)	--	214.3
Other	437.7	161.4	--	599.1	(140.1)	--	459.0
<b>Total Banks</b>	2,562.6	(377.2)	--	2,185.4	(501.1)	--	1,684.3
<b>U.S. Treasuries</b>	628.2	1,374.8	--	2,002.9	1,814.0	--	3,816.9
<b>CMBS</b>	3,610.8	(28.1)	--	3,582.7	111.4	--	3,694.1

- 1st quarter risk reduction was dominated by RMBS, high yield corporates and other exposures with high vulnerability to a “double-dip” recession in the U.S.
- In the 2nd quarter, we reduced holdings in names that are sensitive to the ongoing weakness in Europe and the UK
  - Currently have no exposure to European banks (ex-UK)
  - Reduced exposure to UK banks and remaining exposure is primarily in structures with underlying capital securities
- U.S. Treasury holdings have increased \$3.5b during the year to \$4.1b as of Sept. 30th as risk was reduced in the portfolio



# Investment Strategy – Credit Impairments

## SAP OTTI Losses – Consolidated 09/30/10



USD millions; incl. Jackson, NY, Brooke & Piedmont, if applicable	Q1 2010	Q2 2010	Q3 2010	YTD Q3 2010	FY 2009
<b>RMBS</b>					
Prime	(13.4)	(4.0)	(0.2)	(17.6)	(357.3)
Alt-A	(26.9)	(14.4)	(4.8)	(46.1)	(272.5)
Subprime	(5.7)	(1.8)	(1.6)	(9.1)	(19.4)
<b>Total RMBS</b>	<b>(46.0)</b>	<b>(20.2)</b>	<b>(6.6)</b>	<b>(72.8)</b>	<b>(649.2)</b>
ABS	(5.6)	(16.0)	(4.5)	(26.1)	(8.9)
CMBS	--	--	(11.1)	(11.1)	--
Piedmont	--	(7.5)	--	(7.5)	(52.5)
<b>Total Structured Securities</b>	<b>(51.6)</b>	<b>(43.7)</b>	<b>(22.2)</b>	<b>(117.5)</b>	<b>(710.6)</b>
Corporates / Bank Loans	--	--	--	--	(143.9)
<b>Total Corporates / Bank Loans</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>(143.9)</b>
<b>Total Debt Securities</b>	<b>(51.6)</b>	<b>(43.7)</b>	<b>(22.2)</b>	<b>(117.5)</b>	<b>(854.5)</b>
<b>Commercial Mortgage Loans</b>	<b>(1.8)</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>(1.8)</b>	<b>(13.8)</b>
<b>Total Fixed Maturities</b>	<b>(53.4)</b>	<b>(43.7)</b>	<b>(22.2)</b>	<b>(119.3)</b>	<b>(868.3)</b>
Common Stocks	--	--	--	--	(2.6)
Mutual Funds	--	--	--	--	(2.7)
Preferred Stocks	--	(0.5)	--	(0.5)	(15.0)
<b>Total Equities (1)</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>(0.5)</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>(0.5)</b>	<b>(20.3)</b>
<b>Other Invested Assets (LPs/LLCs) (1)</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>(11.9)</b>	<b>(3.0)</b>	<b>(14.9)</b>	<b>(41.1)</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>(53.4)</b>	<b>(56.1)</b>	<b>(25.2)</b>	<b>(134.7)</b>	<b>(926.6)</b>

1. OTTI charges on equity investments and other invested assets (LPs/LLCs) generally have little or no capital impact in the quarter in which they are recorded. Since mark-to-market losses on these investments have been previously included as unrealized statutory losses.





## Investment Grade Corporate Industry Breakdown



- The investment grade portfolio is overweight BBBs in aggregate
- BBB focus is on utilities, energy, consumer non-cyclical and insurance
- A rated underweights are in banking, capital goods and technology
- This mix is viewed to be defensive in nature in the event of another economic downturn


As of 9/30/10

Methodology is based on the market value and the Investment Grade/Below Investment Grade split is based on the average public rates. These results may differ from IFRS or Statement value reporting.



# Investment Strategy

## Fixed Maturity Total Gross IFRS Unrealized Losses at 9/30/10



- Total gross unrealized losses improved \$187m since June
- Improvement is attributable to several drivers
  - U.S. Treasuries rallied
    - 5 and 10 year U.S. Treasury yields declined by 51 bps and 44 bps, respectively during the 3rd Quarter
  - Tighter corporate spreads
    - Investment grade corporate portfolio spreads tightened 15 bps
    - High yield corporate portfolio spreads tightened 45 bps
    - \$50m of improvement related to 3rd quarter impairments

# Opportunities, Capabilities and Next Steps

Michael Wells, President






# Profitable Growth

## 2004-1H10 Trailing 5-Year CAGR for Annuity Sales and New Business Margins

Jackson has outperformed the industry in annuity sales growth over the business cycle, without compromising new business margins




Source: Industry data per MARC, LIMRA and Advantage Group



# S&P Financial Strength Ratings

## Top Annuity Providers





## Industry-Leading Service

- Six-time winner of Service Quality Management Awards (SQM) 2004, 2006-2010
- Highest customer satisfaction in financial services industry
- World-Class customer service designation
  - Award given to companies for which 80% or more of those surveyed ranked their overall satisfaction as “very satisfied” – the top box ranking



## Key Findings

### Awareness

- Jackson **outperformed** the competitor average for awareness in '09 and '10

### Familiarity

- Jackson's familiarity rose from 13<sup>th</sup> overall in 2003 to **2<sup>nd</sup> overall** in 2009

### Consideration

- Jackson's favorable brand impression **rose 24%** in 2010 to **2<sup>nd</sup> overall**
- Jackson outperformed the average on **5 out of 5** key consideration attributes

### Penetration /Usage

- Jackson ranked **#2 in investment momentum** in 2009 and 2010
- Jackson has ranked **#1 in overall satisfaction** since 2007

### Loyalty/ Advocacy

- Jackson ranked **2<sup>nd</sup> overall** in # of advisors using Jackson as a top 3 provider
- Jackson is **1 of only 2 companies** with a positive Net Promoter Score


### Overall Brand Performance

- Jackson ranked **#2 overall** in 2010 on a composite brand score
- Jackson achieved a strong brand while **spending the** least on advertising



# Low Advertising Spend

## Average Total US Ad Spend (3-year Avg. 07-09)




Source: Hoover's; Company reports; Kantar Media, "Strategy" reports, 1/1/2007 – 12/31/2009





# Solid brand and business performance with comparatively little spend

## Brand Score, Ad Spend and New VA Sales




Sources: Brand Score - Cogent Advisor Brandscape: CoRe Score, 2010; Ad Spend - Kantar Media, "Strategy" reports, 1/1/2007 - 12/31/2009; 2009 New Sales - Quarterly VA Sales & Share data



# Outperforms Industry

**Jackson significantly improved its ratings between 2009 and 2010  
Jackson also outperforms the industry average on 5 out of 5 of the association criteria**




Source: Cogent Advisor Brandscape: Brand Imagery Association, 2009 & 2010



# Jackson improved performance on key attributes that drive adviser choice


Compared to the industry average, Jackson significantly improved its scores in each of the key categories between 2009 and 2010



Source: Cogent Advisor Brandscape: Brand Imagery Association, 2009 & 2010



# Positioned for Growth



- Insurance
- Asset Management
- Wealth Management
- Brokerage